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The widespread use of Kuhnian concepts to depict developments in psycholo-
gical science has long been in need of scholarly attention and critique. There are 
reasons to question whether psychology has reached a level of normal science, 
whether «paradigms» are meaningfully descriptive of differing assumptions and 
research foci, whether the incorporation of cognitive phenomena into learning 
models satisfies criteria for «revolution». Although not their principal aim or con-
tribution, Mülberger and Sturm deftly supply an important aspect of the needed 
critique through analysis of declarations of disciplinary crisis in psychology from 
the late 19th century to the 1970s. The special issue of Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science: Psychology, A Science in Crisis? A Century of Reflections and 
Debates offers a deftly selected set of excellent essays, each one devoted to an 
instance of explicit assertion that the discipline had reached a point of crisis and 
was in need of overhaul. Unlike the clichéd «cognitive revolution», the cases 
covered foreground crisis as an «actor’s category», one with meaning to psycho-
logical scientists themselves rather than a framing strategy for the historian or 
science analyst. Indeed, the editors acknowledge that Kuhn himself saw explicit 
declarations of crisis on the part of scientists to be rare. The special issue, in both 
the editors’ introduction and the diverse set of papers demonstrates that «crisis 
talk» on the part of psychologists at least, is not an uncommon or extraordinary 
event, a demonstration made across eighty years, with representation from Ger-
man, French, Russian, and American psychologists. At the same time, the editors 
do not assume that crisis declared constitutes a crisis in fact: each case is merely 
an instance of «crisis talk». However, each case is informative of the significan-
ce of such talk to disciplinary challenges and developments; each is worthy of 
analysis and greater understanding of its interplay with historical disciplinary and 
nondisciplinary dynamics. 
Each paper includes reflection on the nature of the crisis heralded, the fea-
tures of the discipline asserted to be untenable, the assumptions held in doubt, 
the problems alleged to require a radical overturning of frameworks, units of 
analysis, methods, and disciplinary aims. Chapters also detail the forms of criti-
que, the degree of agreement with the acknowledgment across the discipline, 
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social and cultural considerations, the outcomes of the declaration, its impact 
on disciplinary values and practices. At least as interesting as the declarations of 
crisis are the responses to declarations on the part of contemporaries.
The discipline would seem to be in continual crisis judging from the papers 
as a set. Moreover, they illustrate collectively that «psychology has no one single 
persistent problem, perhaps not even a clearly definable set of such problems» 
(Sturm and Mülberger, p. 430). There is not one complaint repeatedly raised in 
different voices but really vastly different problems indicated and different solu-
tions proposed: The earliest declaration is traced to Rudolf Willy, and analyzed 
by Mülberger to focus on psychology-philosophy relations, with blame for the 
crisis levied on Wundt for what Willy regarded as toxic metaphysical spillage. 
Willy expressed additional alarm over the «branching» of psychology into too 
many disparate directions, obscuring the essential subject matter and telos of 
the fledgling science. The lack of disciplinary unity is a common crisis theme, and 
is notably a central feature of Bühler’s more influential critique as Sturm presents 
it. Yet it is by no means a general feature of crisis talk even of that century. John 
Carson’s discussion highlights 19th century French openness to variety in focus 
and methods, a tolerant if not celebratory attitude toward pluralism. By contrast, 
the conviction that psychology must rise above the mere accounting of psychic 
facts to an explanation of their meaning and significance is a theme common to 
declarations of crisis as diverse as those of Hans Driesch, Gestalt psychology, and 
Husserl, as explicated in the contributions by Allesch, Hatfield, and Feest, respec-
tively. Moreover, the social utility of psychology, its potential applicability to the 
solving of human problems (or more accurately, the lack or failure of its appli-
cability) is the focus of the crisis proclaimed by Hofstätter, Vygotsky, and 1970’s 
American social psychology, as analyzed in interesting chapters by Gundlach, 
Hyman, and Faye. The introduction further points to different dimensions of crisis 
talk that accompany differences in the content of the acknowledged crisis. Crisis 
is viewed as a constructive force by some, destructive by others, a permanent 
trait of the discipline or a temporary state of affairs. The crisis is singular in some 
declarations, a web of interrelated malfunctions for others.
This leads to my only point of critique for the extremely worthy project of 
the special issue. Every paper is a model of careful, subtle, and informative his-
torical scholarship. The introduction is clear and compelling, making perfectly 
evident the scholarly value of attention to declarations of crisis in psychology, 
convincingly arguing the challenge it poses to certain of Kuhn’s assumptions. 
Let me be clear, then, in acknowledging the special issue to be a tour de force, 
a major contribution to both psychology and history of science. It is superb. In 
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keeping with its scholarly integrity it is the editors’ intent to let the papers speak 
for themselves, to keep framing analysis and general conclusions to a minimum, 
affording analysis and reanalysis on the part of any whose interest in crisis is 
piqued. Thus the editors seek to «pave the way for taking crisis declarations 
more into account when studying the development of the field» (Sturm and 
Mülberger, p. 431). Yet because of the nature of the focus on crisis, the gravity 
and lingering import of the questions these papers provoke, some preliminary 
analysis across the exemplars offered, a glimpse at the editors’ views on points of 
similarity and key differences, or the enduring implications of these crisis decla-
rations for the discipline would provide some welcome signposts as well as pa-
vement. Mülberger’s study of Willy concludes with a statement that could easily 
be applied to the excellent discussions of crisis that appear in the special issue 
as a set: «It is the authors that declare a crisis who keep the black box of science 
open, compelling others by their reflection and criticism to reconsider funda-
mental issues» (p. 443). The authors who analyze declarations of crisis perform a 
similar function. ❚
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